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ABSTRACT
This study proposes a simple and efficient one-out-of-two quantum oblivious transfer (QOT) protocol based on nonorthogonal
states. The nonorthogonal property grants quantum bit immunity to some operations in order to achieve the irreversible goal of
discarding a message, resulting in a one-out-of-two selection effect. In addition, it can also prevent entangled cheating from an
illegal agent. The resulting QOT protocol is therefore built directly on quantum resources, rather than on a two-level structure
which must first create two classical keys using the quantum resources (all-or-nothing QOT), and then build the one-out-of-two
protocol from there. Furthermore, the proposed protocol allows Alice to test Bob’s loyalty by comparing the measurement
results. Moreover, the relationship with the no-go theorem is discussed in detail; this relationship is often overlooked in other
studies. The no-go theorem discussion and security analysis demonstrate that the proposed protocol does not belong to the
no-go theorem constraint, and is secure against both external and internal attacks. In addition, the efficacy analysis shows that
the proposed protocol is more efficient than other two-level structure protocols.
Introduction
Since people first began to share information, they have striven toward the ultimate goal of unconditionally secure communica-
tion. To this end, cryptographers have used many difficult and complex mathematical problems, for which is very difficult to
evaluate all possible solutions. In 1984, Bennett and Brassard1 first proposed quantum key distribution (QKD), also called
BB84, based on quantum physics with uncertainty, and the No-Cloning theorem2, which guarantees unconditionally secure
key distribution between a source and a destination3–6. Moreover, the superposition and entanglement properties inspired
Deutsch and Jozsa7, Shor8 and Grover9 to develop their parallel search algorithms. These algorithms produced unsafe RSA8
and AES9–11 systems, which are famous examples of asymmetric and symmetric cryptography. In addition, quantum computing
hardware development is making significant advances. Google, NASA and D-WAVE12 have cooperated to develop an analogous
quantum simulator with 512 bits, which is 10 million to 1000 million times more powerful than a single processor core, but
cannot launch real quantum algorithms. Meanwhile, IBM has developed a 5-qubit quantum computer, and claims to have
broken through the physical limit and hope to be able to develop a 50-qubit quantum computer for commercial use within the
next decade. Furthermore, a Chinese research group successfully launched quantum satellites on the 16th of August, 201613.
These satellites create entangled qubits, and are thus able to generate secure keys for globe-spanning quantum communications.
In the near future, quantum computers will have a significant effect on our daily lives, as their computational capacity poses a
major threat to classical cryptography, while at the same time offering massive potential for far more secure communication.
Since the hardware breakthrough, quantum cryptography has extended and diversified from classical cryptography, has
received a great deal more research attention. One important branch is quantum oblivious transfer (QOT), which offers many
exciting new applications such as secure computation, bit-commitment, remote coin-flipping, digital contract signing and more.
The two most commonly used oblivious transfers (OT) are the all-or-nothing and one-out-of-two protocols. All-or-nothing OT
was first introduced by Rabin14 in 1981. In the OT protocol, a sender Alice wants to send a secret message, m ∈ {0,1}, to a
receiver Bob who has only a 50% probability of receiving the message m. He could learn either the message m with 100%
reliability, or nothing about m. At the end of the OT, Alice remains oblivious as to whether Bob received the message m or not.
Subsequently, Even et al.15 presented one-out-of-two oblivious transfer, in which Alice wishes to transfer two messages, m0
and m1, to Bob, and he can choose one of them, but will have no idea what the other message is. Analogously, Alice learns
nothing about which message Bob chooes when the protocol is complete. In 1988, Cre´peau16 provided a method for building
one-out-of-two OT by using p-all-or-nothing OT, in which the receiver has p probability of receiving the message m. The
receiver can build two key sets, key0 and key1, which he learns with 100% certainty and 0% certainty, as his choices. Based on
Bob’s choice j, he asks Alice to encrypt her messages m0 and m1 using key0 and key1 if j = 0⇒ key0, or j = 1⇒ key1. Then
Bob can receive m j by the method. Using this method, Cre´peau16 proved that the two OTs are equivalent at the classical level.
Another related founding block is bit-commitment (BC), which was proved computationally equivlent17, 18 with one-out-of-two
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QOT at the quantum level, which means each can be used as a founding block for the others. These reductions significantly
affected OT at both the classical and quantum levels. The discussion in this study will therefore include these improtant
precursors.
Cre´peau and Kilian19 proposed the first all-or-nothing QOT in 1988, and Bennett et al.17 proposed the first one-out-of-two
QOT protected by quantum error correct code in 1992. In 1994, Cre´peau20 presented a one-out-of-two QOT based on quantum
bit-commitment (QBC), which guarantees the security on the assumption that Bob cannot delay the quantum measurement. In
1995, Yao21 further proved that the protocol is secure against coherent measurement if QBC is secure. In fact, the possibility
of QOT was an open problem22 in 1996. In a period time therefore, the above reductions were used to build other protocols.
However, Mayers23 demonstrated that unconditionally secure bit-commitment is impossible. At the same time, Lo and Chau24
took the same result and produced the well known no-go theorem (also called the Mayers-Lo-Chau theorem, the MLC no-go
theorem was shown within the scope of non-relativistic physics) in 1997. This means any QBC based QOT is insecure, and
implies insecure QOT. Furthermore, Lo25 in the same year showed that all one-side two-party computations (allowing only one
of the two parties to learn the result) are necessarily insecure, which includes one-out-of-two QOT. This was called Lo’s no-go
theorem. Therefore, following the above computational equivalent16–18, these theorems have caused extreme difficulty for the
development of QOT research. Finally, however, Colbeck26 and Buhrman et al.27 complemented to that two-side two-party
computation is insecure in a relativistic quantum protocol.
Recent studies have, however, proposed various methods of avoiding these no-go theorems. In 2002, Shimizu and Imoto28
presented an interesting communication method analogous to one-out-of-two QOT with a 50% probability of completing
the communication. This means that the receiver cannot learn a message unambigously, and Lo’s no-go theorem is thus
avoided. They29 then improved the security of their protocol against entangled pair attacks in 2003. In 2005, Damga˚rd et al.30
proposed all-or-nothing and bit-commitment protocols based on BB84, which focused on implementation. They noted that
no-go theorems did not take three scenarios into account: First, where an agent’s computing power is bounded; second, where
the communication is noisy; and third, where an eavesdropper is under some physical limitation, e.g., quantum memory is
limited. In the same year, Wolf and Wullschleger31 showed a reduction between OT and PR-boxes (proposed by Popescu and
Rohrlich32, also known as a PR non-local box). In 2006, He and Wang33, proposed an all-or-nothing QOT using four entangled
states, which, as a result, no longer fell into the Lo’s no-go theorem25 class. Thereafter, they34 showed that two kinds of QOT
are nonequivalent at the quantum level, and found that the one-out-of-two QOT built on all-or-nothing QOT using Cre´peau’s
reduction16 is not rigorously subject to Lo’s no-go theorem25. The key point is that the receiver inputs their choice before
the sender inputs their message m0 and m1, and the result is that the function of the one-out-of-two QOT differs from that of
Lo’s no-go theorem25. Subsequently, Yang et al.35 presented a one-out-of-two QOT using tripartite entangled states based
Cre´peau’s reduction16, and also showed that it is not covered by the cheating strategy of Lo’s no-go theorem25. Unfortunately,
the protocol cannot work because it does not change the measurement basis, which means that while Alice can determine of the
all-or-nothing QOT key, an eavesdropper will also be able to obtain the key.
So far, researchers have, after the nonequivalence proof34, developed QOT using different methods and reduction16. The
methods preposed to date can be roughly classified into 5 types: 1. PR non-locality box; 2. QBC-based QOT; 3. Bit-string
QOT; 4. Cre´peau’s reduction16 and 5. Others. These methods will be discussed below as follows:
1. QBC-based QOT: The key discussion point here is the MLC no-go theorem23, 24, which shows that no QBC is secure,
and how it can be used for QOT. In 1999, Kent36 proposed an unconditionally secure BC based on relativistic scenario,
which is secure against classical and quantum attacks. He37 went on to present a secure quantum bit-string commitment
scheme based on redundant code in 2003, which allows the receiver to recover a bit from the bit-string. He also developed
unconditionally secure QBC38 based on his previous works36, 37. At this point, an interesting question arises, as discussed
by He39 in 2015: could unconditionally secure QBC lead to secure QOT? Although most QBC-based QOT is insecure,
He cannot assert whether other kinds of unconditionally secure QOT exist (the transmission He used is Yao’s research21),
especially relativistic QOT. In addition, He39 also questions whether Lo and others’ no-go theorems25–27 (includes
two-side two-party) covered all kinds of QOT, with proof, such as a class in which the sender helps the receiver to
compute a prescribed function. This area clearly requires more research attention and development.
2. PR non-locality box: After the reduction from OT to PR non-locality box by Wolf and Wullschleger31, Buhrman et
al.40 proposed a QBC protocol based on PR-box, and went on to construct one-out-of-two QOT in 2006. Chou et al.41
constructed a PR non-locality box using ten entangled qubits, and used it to build one-out-of-two QOT. Furthermore,
Gisinet al.42 introduced a method to build one-out-of-two QOT with an 85.3% success rate using a single qubit and
rotation, much higher than that achieved by Shimizu and Imoto28. Despite the PR non-locality property being applied,
these protocols did not exhibit the relationship between the no-go theorems; in particular, the security of the two-side
two-party method was in doubt26, 27, 39.
3. Bit-string QOT: Despite the advent of quantum bit-string commitment was developed37, research into bit-string QOT
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continued. In 2015, Souto et al.43 proposed all-or-nothing bit-string QOT based on quantum state computational
distinguishability with fully flipped permutations (QSCDff 44), which is a hard problem even for a quantum computer.
They proved its security against few-qubit coherent attacks, leaving the question of general multi-qubit measurements
open. However, He45 noted that Souto’s protocol43 is not secure, because Bob checks Alice’s behavior only when
his received message is correct, so a dishonest Alice can always deceive Bob into receiving nothing while ensuring
that he remains unaware of the deception. Souto’s protocol43 also happened to be a building block for constructing
one-out-of-two QOT using Cre´peau’s reduction16. Souto et al.46 replied that He’s comment45 was not within the
scope of the all-or-nothing OT proposed by Rabin14. Moreover, Souto et al.46 responded to the deception issue with
a secure semi-honest one-out-of-two QOT against a malicious Alice. More recently, Plesch et al.47 agreed with He45
that all-or-nothing QOT with security flaws cannot be used to construct a secure one-out-of-two QOT, and presented an
improved version which demonstrated that building a secure one-out-of-two QOT requires a perfect all-or-nothing QOT
using Cre´peau’s reduction16.
4. Cre´peau’s reduction16: This category consists mostly of one-out-of-two QOT protocols after He’s proof34, and some
one-out-of-two QOT protocols48–53. The protocol proposed in this study is similar, but does not first generate two
keys by all-or-nothing QOT. Li Yang48 first presented all-or-nothing QOT by nonorthogonal states, and used it as a
basis to construct one-out-of-two QOT in 2013. Meanwhile, Yu-Guang Yang and his research team, in research that
began in 2007, have proposed several QOT protocols: They used the same state to detect all cheats, and then build
all-or-nothing up to one-out-of-two QOT51; this lead to an untrusted third party method49, created all-or-nothing QOT
using Bell state measurements, and then further built up one-out-of-two QOT52. Furthermore, they proposed one-out-of-n
QOT53 based any two nonorthogonal states by cooperative measuring the qubit sequence to create the key, and then
build one-out-of-n QOT, in 2017. However, these methods have the disadvantage that they require many qubits
for the classical key generation before the one-out-of-two QOT. The key point of He’s nonequivalence proof34
is that Bob and Alice’s inputs should not be independent (The example of He’s proof is that Bob choose before
Alice inputs her two messages), rather than first creating the classical key. If some properties of quantum physics
can ensure that the choice cannot be detected and depended on Alice’s inputs, then one-out-of-two QOT can be
implemented on qubits directly, which means it will be simpler and more efficient.
5. Others: Besides the above, some QOT protocols have been proposed from different viewpoints or based on other
problems that are difficlt for even a quantum computer to solve. Some researchers have proposed practical QOT17, 30, 54,
etc., which are based on technological limitations. On the other hand, some researchers have turned the security
assumptions into other problems too difficult for quantum computers. Yang et al.50 proposed one-out-of-two QOT
based on a symmetrically private information retrieval method in 2015; Souto et al.43 proposed all-or-nothing bit-string
QOT based on QSCDff 44 and Rodrigues et al.55 presented all-or-nothing bit-string QOT based on quantum public-key
cryptography56.
This research has 3 contributions. The first clearly arranges and decribes the complicated relationship among
QOT, QBC and no-go theorems23–25in the Introduction; the second discusses the relationship between the proposed
protocol and Lo’s no-go theorem25 in detail; while the third proposes a simple and efficient one-out-of-two QOT using
nonorthogonal states, building up these states directly, rather than basing the protocol on all-or-nothing QOT, but
otherwise corresponding to He’s34 condition. The proposed protocol is therefore more efficient than the others dis-
cussed. The key point of the proposed protocol is that choice is made before Alice inputs her message m0 and m1. This
makes one of two message to be the global phase, which cannot be measured and leaves obliviousness. This means
that it is impossible for the proposed protocol to transfer more than one bit of information, achieving the purpose of
one-out-of-two QOT.
The remainder of this study is arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces the preliminaries, which include the quantum
computation notation and some theorems. Section 3 illustrates the proposed protocol, and its relationship with no-go
theorems23–25 in detail. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the proposed protocol’s security and efficiency, and compare it to other
protocols. Finally, conclusions are given in section 6. The remainder of this study is arranged as follows. Section 2 introduces
the preliminaries, which include the quantum computation notation and some theorems. Section 3 illustrates the proposed
protocol, and its relationship with no-go theorems23–25 in detail. Sections 4 and 5 analyze the proposed protocol’s security and
efficiency, and compare it to other protocols. Finally, conclusions are given in section 6.
Results
There are five subsections in this section, including the preliminaries, the proposed protocol, its relationship with Lo’s no-go
theorem25, and its security and efficacy analysis. The preliminaries introduce the properties of quantum machines and key
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points of the proposed protocol. The protocol detail is decribed in the proposed protocol section. Its relationship with Lo’s
no-go theorem25 is discussed, with particular emphasis on the protocol’s degree of compliance with He’s proof34. Finally, the
security and efficacy analysis is decribed in the last two subsections.
Preliminaries.
This subsection introduces the quantum machine notations and operations used in this study. The classical information carrier
is called a “bit”. The quantum information carrier is called a “quantum bit”, or “qubit”. A qubit collapses some states with a
basis when it is measured. There are two common bases: the Z-basis and the X-basis. Those two bases are two bases of a
2D-plane where the Z-basis (standard basis) is |0〉= (10) and |1〉= (01) and the X-basis is |+〉= 1√2(11)= 1√2 (|0〉+ |1〉) and
|−〉= 1√
2
( 1
−1
)
= 1√
2
(|0〉− |1〉).
Two important quantum properties are superposition and entanglement. Superposition means that a qubit can simultaneously
present |0〉 and |1〉 at the same time. For example, |ψ〉= α |0〉+β |1〉, and this qubit will be collapsed to |0〉 and |1〉 with |α|2
and |β |2 probabilities, respectively. For instance, state |−〉 is considered as superposition under the Z-basis. It has a
∣∣∣ 1√2 ∣∣∣2 = 12
probability of collapsing to |0〉, and a
∣∣∣− 1√2 ∣∣∣2 = 12 probability of collapsing to |1〉.
Moreover, unitary operations are considered as gates in quantum computers. There are four common operations, called
Pauli matrices, which are {I,X ,Y,Z} as Eq. 1. As a result, operations I and Z are immunized at the Z-basis, and I and X are
immunized at the X-basis. The results show that a single qubit cannot be observed for all four operations, which means some
information is ignored, and this is a key element of the proposed protocol. For example, the state |0〉 after gate Y becomes −|1〉,
i.e. |1〉 will be given when the qubits is measured. This negative amplitude is called global phase, and cannot be measured.
Another important gate is Hadamard gate as Eq. 1, also called H gate. The H gate can be used to convert between two different
bases (Z- and X-basis). It corresponds to HH∗ = I and H = H∗. For example, the state |0〉 (|+〉) after gate H becomes |+〉
(|0〉).
Entanglement is another important property, and means that qubits cannot be presented as single. There are four common
entangled states, called Bell states as Eq. 2. For example, when measure |Φ+〉 is measured in Eq. 2, the result may be either
|00〉12 or |11〉12, where the subscript indicates the qubit order. As a result, it is possible to know two qubit states immediately
when one is measured. Einstein referred to this as “spooky action at a distance”.
I =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, X =
(
0 1
1 0
)
, Y =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
, Z =
(
1 0
0 −1
)
, H =
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(1)
∣∣Φ+〉= 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12,
∣∣Φ−〉= 1√
2
(|00〉− |11〉)12,∣∣Ψ+〉= 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)12,
∣∣Ψ−〉= 1√
2
(|01〉− |10〉)12
(2)
The proposed protocol
Consider the following scenario. First, is the one-side two-party protocol. Suppose Alice (sender) has a secret input
i ∈ {1,2, ...,n} and Bob (receiver) has a secret input j ∈ {1,2, ...,m}. Then Alice helps Bob to compute a function f (i, j) ∈
{1,2, ..., p}. According to the above, the one-out-of-two OT can be mapped so that the Alice’s input i can be considered as her
secret message i(m0,m1), and Bob’s input j can be considered as his choice. In addition, there are three security requirements
for one-out-of-two OT: (a) Bob learns f (i, j) unambiguously, (b) Alice learns nothing about j and f (i, j), and (c) Bob learns
nothing about i more than what logically follows from the values of j and f (i, j).
The basis of the proposed protocol is B9257, which has been proved unconditionally secure both in theory and implemen-
tation58–60, which means that no one can identify all bases of the qubit, perfectly, without any information from the creator.
Another key property is that some operations are immune at some bases, which means that it is not possible to identify all
operations by single qubit. The proposed protocol can test Bob’s loyalty under the security requirements; that is, Alice can
check the initial states are correct. In addition, if Alice wants to lie to Bob, she will cause the error, which can be discovered by
Bob at application level. The proposed protocol consists of six steps as follows:
Step 1. Bob creates a candidate qubit sequence according to his choice intentions j0 and j1 to state |0〉 and |+〉, respectively.
The H gate can be considered as his choice intention in this stage. This sequence must be longer than the OT sequence
containing the number of received messages, channel checking and Bob’s loyalty testing qubits. In addition, the
channel checking and loyalty testing states are different, the former belonging to {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, where those
4/12
qubits are also called decoy qubits, and the latter belonging to {|0〉 , |+〉}. That is, N is the minimum length at which
Bob will receive N messages, M is the channel checking number, K is the number of Bob’s loyalty testing qubits,
and the total length of the QOT sequence is N+M+2K. Bob reandomly prepares M qubits from {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}
(each qubit is independent), and inserts them to the sequence. After this, he also inserts his N and 2K candidate choice
intentions ({|0〉 , |+〉}) into the sequence, and then sends them to Alice.
Step 2. Once she receives, the sequence from Bob, Alice first checks the channel for an eavedropper (Eve), and then tests
Bob’s loyalty. First, she asks Bob to publish the bases and states that he created. If the measurement results are greater
that the given error rate, then Eve is present on the channel, and Alice and Bob abort their communication; otherwise,
Alice then goes on to test Bob. She abandons qubits for channel checking and randomly selects some positions in order
to request that Bob publish their bases. If other measurement results, i.e. /∈ {|0〉 , |+〉}, are greater than the given error
rate, then Bob is considered dishonest, and she aborts this communication; otherwise, she proceeds to the next step.
Step 3. Since the loyalty test may disturb the order of Bob’s intentions, Bob must ask Alice to reorder those qubits. Twice K
qubits can fill up the vacancy of intentions. At this step, the sequence after reordering represents Bob’s real choices.
Step 4. Alice now inputs her secret message m0 and m1 by operations I,Z,X ,Y according to the combinations “00”, “01”, “10”
and “11”, respectively.
Step 5. Alice then inserts the decoy qubits {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} randomly in the sequence for channel checking, then sends
them to Bob.
Step 6. When Bob receives the sequence from Alice, he asks Alice to publish the positions and states of the decoy qubits. If
the error rate is higher than channel error rate, they abort this communication and return to step 1. Otherwise, Bob
learns the messages by the bases he prepared.
For a simple example of the proposed protocol, with only two received messages at the end of the protocol and without
channel the checking version, Bob prepares two qubits in |0+〉12 to represent his choices, and an additional two qubits in
|0+〉34 for loyalty testing. He then sends these four qubits to Alice. Once she receives a sequence in order |0+0+〉1234, Alice
asks Bob to publish the state of the fourth qubit, and measures it for comparison to the publishing and the measurement result
for loyalty testing. Bob then asks Alice to reorder the remaining qubits following the order 21, and the states become |+0〉21,
with qubit 3 aborted. Alice performs Z and X according to her messages “0112” and “1034” at qubits 2 and 1, respectively. This
makes the sequence |−1〉21. She then sends the sequence back to Bob. Bob then performs X- and Z-basis measurements to
learn the second and first messages, “1” and “1”, respectively.
Relationship with no-go theorems23–25
Two no-go theorems23–25 are discussed in this study: the MLC no-go theorem23, 24 and Lo’s no-go theorem25. The MLC
no-go theorem23, 24 provides a strategy for cheating protocols similar to BB841. This makes bit-commitment no-go. Lo’s
no-go theorem25 provides a strategy for learning all messages in one-side two-party secure computation, which means that
one-out-of-two QOT is insecure.
MLC no-go theorem23, 24: The MLC no-go theorem23, 24 shows the entangled cheat, which means that the sender can create
Eq. 3 and obtain the same results as the receiver. For example, the sender prepares the sequence under the qubit states
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} and sends them to the receiver. The receiver then randomly selects the checking qubits, and asks the
sender to publish the bases. As shown in Eq. 3, the sender can determine the bases after the receiver’s selections. The
sender can then always escape the channel checking. This cheat strategy may steal all the messages involved. Indeed, the
entangled strategy may be used as Dense Coding61. If it is successful, Bob can learn all messages from Alice.
However, the proposed protocol uses nonorthogonal states {|0〉 , |+〉}, and thus resist to the entangled cheat strategy.
Recall that in step 2 Alice asks Bob to publish the bases by her random choices, and because of Eq. 3, the states |1〉 and
|−〉 may be given, which means that each qubit for testing has a 12 probability of detecting dishonest Bob. Therefore, the
security ξ can be determined by number of K as Eq. 4, and N and K are independent.∣∣Φ+〉12 = 1√2 (|00〉+ |11〉)12 = 1√2 (|++〉+ |−−〉)12 (3)
ξ = 1− (1
2
)K (4)
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Lo’s no-go theorem25: The key point of Lo’s no-go theorem25 is requirement (a), that “Bob learns f (i(m0,m1), j) un-
ambiguously”, which leads to a 100% that the selected state will collapse. In addition, the result is given af-
ter operations that are reversible. As a result, the choice can be made repeatedly to learn all messages. That is
f (i(m0,m1), j)
U j0→ f (i(m0,m1), j0) = m0, where j represents not yet selected, Bob can perform inverse matrix U−1j0
to obtain m0
U−1j0→ f (i(m0,m1), j). Bob can learn all messages by repeating the above flow. However, He and Wang34
provided detailed discussion and definitions of two scenarios, namely ideal one-side two-party secure computation
(definition A) and rigorous one-out-of-two OT (definition B). Obviously, definition B is a special case of definition A,
and definition B is the scenarios of Lo’s proof25. As a result, definition B is that Alice inputs her messages first, then
Bob inputs his choice. The important discussion of He and Wang34 is whether it is equivalent for Bob to input his
choice first, and for Alice to subsequently input her message by Cre´peau’s reduction16? The answer is no: the funciton
becomes f (i(m0,m1, j), j) when Bob inputs his choice first, and f (i(m0,m1, j0), j1) is meaningless for f (i(m0,m1, j), j).
Therefore, he cannot change i from i(m0,m1, j0) to i(m0,m1, j1). This proof shows that the order of choice and message
input may be different, which means they are dependent. Extending the concept of He’s proof34 to the general case39, if
Alice and Bob should interact with each other and Bob cannot eliminate his operation independently, it does not belong
to Lo’s no-go theorem25.
In the proposed protocol (definition C), following the above relation, two conditions must be secure: (1) Bob’s choice must
correspond to He’s proof34, 39, and (2) the bases that Bob prepares cannot be known 100%. To show (1), definitions C-i
and C-ii, mean that the immune process and no one unitary operation can rotate two different qubit states (nonorthogonal)
to be the same (if so, the operation becomes irreversible and cannot be used for a quantum machine). On the other hand,
the global phase must also not be detectable. In other word, the choice can be considered as H, and message inputs can
be considered as {I,X ,Y,Z}. The result of H×G different from G×H, where G ∈ {I,X ,Y,Z}. As a result, Bob cannot
eliminate his inputs without Alice’s help, and it belongs to He’s proof34, 39. Therefore, these conditions show that the
proposed function belongs to f (i(m0,m1, j), j) and corresponds to He’s proof34, 39. (2) According to the B9257, Alice
can obtain 25% of Bob’s choice, and the remaining 75% remains unknown. For the remaining 75% of qubits, Alice
may prepare {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} to replace the originals randomly. After this, Bob performs measurement according
to the bases he prepared. That is, Alice cannot know which states Bob measured, as this would violate more than one
conditions from definition A, and means that Alice can never cheat Bob because the error would be discovered at the
application level. These discussions show that the proposed protocol is not a Lo’s no-go theorem25, and successfully
builds one-out-of-two QOT.
• Definition A: Ideal one-sided two-party secure computation
(A-i) Bob learns f (i, j) unambiguously.
(A-ii) Alice learns nothing about j and f (i, j).
(A-iii) Bob learns nothing about i more than what logically follows from the values of j and f (i, j).
• Definition B: rigorous one-out-of-two OT
(B-i) Alice inputs i, which is a pair of message (m0,m1).
(B-ii) Bob inputs j = 0 or 1.
(B-iii) At the end of the protocol, Bob learns message m j, but not the other message m j¯, i.e., the protocol is an
ideal one-side two-party secure computation f (m0,m1, j = 0) = m0 and f (m0,m1, j = 1) = m1.
(B-iv) Alice does not know which m j Bob received.
• Definition C: The proposed protocol without testing
(C-i) Bob inputs j = 0 or 1 to change the qubit state to {|0〉 , |+〉} (Z- or X-basis) according to his choice intention.
(C-ii) Alice inputs her messages m0 and m1 using {I,X ,Y,Z}.
(C-iii) Bob learns either message m0 and m1 by the bases (Z- or X-basis) he prepared.
Security Analysis
Two security conditions are considered in this study: external and internal attacks. External attacks involve an eavesdropper,
Eve, attempting to steal messages without being detected. Internal attacks involve either Alice or Bob attempting to steal the
other’s secret, i.e., Alice wants to learn Bob’s choices, or Bob wants to learn both of Alice’s messages.
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External Attack
Alice and Bob must ensure that the communication channel between them is secure, because without channel checking or
reduced frequency62, Eve will be able to eavesdrop on their messages illicitly. In the proposed protocol, several single qubits
are used as decoy qubits ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, and randomly inserted into the transmitted sequence for channel checking, as
in steps 1 and 5 of the protocol. The positions and states of those qubits are then published and measured in order to check
whether Eve is present. If the measurement results with the same bases are different and the error rate is higher than the channel
error rate, then Eve is present. Two common external attack strategies are the intercept-and-resend attack, and the entangling
attack. They are discussed below:
Intercept-and-resend attack: Eve intercepts all qubits and measures them in order to obtain the messages during transmission
when the sender sends the qubit sequence to the receiver, and then resends those qubits to the receiver. This action should
disturb the qubit states including decoy qubits. According the detection rate of BB841, each qubit has 14 probability of
detecting Eve, and the detection rate increases with the number of decoy qubits M. As a result, the detection rate can be
given by legal agents with the security ξ as Eq. 5.
ξ = 1− (3
4
)M (5)
Entangling attack: Eve may use another method that does not disturb the qubit states, which is the entangling attack. She
intercepts the transmission sequence, prepares an ancillary qubit |E〉 and performs a unitary operation Ue on the
intercepted qubit in order to entangle it with her qubit |E〉 during transmission. The unitary operation Ue can be defined
as follows:
Ue(|0〉 |E〉) = a |0〉 |e00〉+b |1〉 |e01〉
Ue(|1〉 |E〉) = c |0〉 |e10〉+d |1〉 |e11〉
Ue(|+〉 |E〉) = 1√
2
(a |0〉 |e00〉+b |1〉 |e01〉+ c |0〉 |e10〉+d |1〉 |e11〉)
=
1
2
|+〉(a |e00〉+b |e01〉+ c |e10〉+d |e11〉)+ 12 |−〉(a |e00〉−b |e01〉+ c |e10〉−d |e11〉)
Ue(|−〉|E〉) = 1√
2
(a |0〉 |e00〉+b |1〉 |e01〉− c |0〉 |e10〉−d |1〉 |e11〉)
=
1
2
|+〉(a |e00〉+b |e01〉− c |e10〉−d |e11〉)+ 12 |−〉(a |e00〉−b |e01〉− c |e10〉+d |e11〉),
(6)
where |e00〉, |e01〉, |e10〉, and |e11〉 are four states determined by unitary operationUe, and |a|2+ |b|2 = 1 and |c|2+ |d|2 = 1.
If Eve wants to avoid detection, operation Ue must satisfy a = d = 1, b = c = 0 and |e00〉 = |e11〉, and as a result, no
information can be obtained from the proposed protocol in this way.
Internal Attack
Internal attacks involve the legal agents Alice and Bob attempting to steal each other’s secret information, i.e., Alice wants to
learn Bob’s choice, and Bob wants to learn all messages sent by Alice. Therefore, two conditions must be discussed, which are
Alice’s strategy and Bob’s strategy:
Alice’s strategy: A dishonest Alice can obtain 25% of Bob’s choice, as with B9257, because the incorrect basis measurement
can lead to incorrect measurement results. For example, Bob sends state |0〉 to Alice, the incorrect basis (X-basis) used
means a 12 probability, and incorrect state (|−〉) is obtained, which also has 12 probability, and the total probability is 14 =
0.25. The remaining 75% is unknown, which means that Alice should randomly create some states ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}
to send to the receiver Bob. However, she cannot know Bob’s final meausrement results because he does not publish any
information about the bases. That is , he cannot decrypt correctly with 34 × 12 × 12 = 18.75% for each bit at the application
level, and will be aware that Alice is dishonest. For example, in a simple coin-flipping1 protocol, Alice creates a random
bit-string to present her coin-flipping result. She then communicates her bit-string to Bob with the proposed QOT. Bob
publicly guesses the coin-flipping result. Alice then sends her random bit-string to Bob. He can compare the result with
his QOT result. If Alice wants to learn Bob’s choice, each bit has an 18.75% of being wrong, Bob can thus detect that
Alice is cheating.
On the other hand, if the protocol41 works with a dummy message encrypted by the quantum resource, each qubit of the
dummy message has an 18.75%×50% = 9.375% of being wrong, where the 50% is the probability that the error state
will result.
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Bob’s strategy: A dishonest Bob cdan prepare entangled qubit as an MLC no-go theorem23, 24, as in Eq. 4. In this way, he
can learn all messages from Alice, as in Eq. 7, where the subscript represents the qubit order, i.e., he can perfectly
identify which operation Alice performed on qubit 1. However, only two states, |0〉 and |+〉, can be measured in the
proposed protocol. Alice randomly selects K positions, and asks Bob to publish the bases he prepared in step 2. If other
measurement results are given, i.e. /∈ {|0〉 , |+〉}, Bob is dishonest. Furthermore, the detection rate shown in Eq. 4, and
the security ξ can be determine by legal agents.
I1
∣∣Φ+〉= I1 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 = 1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉)12 =
∣∣Φ+〉
X1
∣∣Φ+〉= X1 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)12 = 1√
2
(|++〉− |−−〉)12 =
∣∣Ψ+〉
Y1
∣∣Φ+〉= Y1 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 = 1√
2
(|01〉− |10〉)12 = 1√
2
(|+−〉−|−+〉)12 =
∣∣Ψ−〉
Z1
∣∣Φ+〉= Z1 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)12 = 1√
2
(|00〉− |11〉)12 = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ |−+〉)12 =
∣∣Φ−〉
(7)
Efficacy Analysis
In this section, the performance of the proposed protocol is compared with those of three modern one-out-of-two QOTs48, 50, 51
based on Cre´peau’s reduction16. These protocols are two-level structures that build one-out-of-two OT on all-or-nothing QOT.
In addition, the probability of all-or-nothing QOT p (p is the probability of the unambiguous key) is not always 50%. It requires
significant quantum resources to build two classical keys (one is unambiguous and the other is unknown) using all-or-nothing
QOT for one-out-of-two OT. In addition, every transmission should include decoy qubits for channel checking. Some protocols
may need many transmissions to complete all-or-nothing QOT, and use many decoy qubits. For fairness, the variable security ξ
is at least 99.9999% as long as 50 decoy qubits are used for each transmission. After this, the most important indicators are the
conversion efficiency of two OTs, number of transmissions (which indirectly affects the number of decoy qubits) and loyalty
testing. The total cost of all protocols under the R messages received requirement is calculated, and results are given in Table 1.
Here, only the quantum cost is calculated, which means that only the all-or-nothing QOT part of other protocols is counted.
Detailed descriptions of these protocols are given below:
Yang’s protocol48: This protocol uses the B9257 protocol as the all-or-nothing QOT base. Therefore, it requires four qubits
for an unambiguous key and only one transmission. However, this research focuses on the bit-commitment protocol more
than the OT protocol, with no further security analysis of the QOT protocol, or strategies for detecting Eve. Therefore, no
strategy is provided for the loyalty testing between Alice and Bob. In addition, the number of decoy qubits is computed
as defined above because the orginal detecting strategy of B9257 is mroe inefficient. As a result, the total quantum cost is
4×R+50.
YSW protocol50: This protoocl is the reduction of BB841 to B9257. It uses the BB841 strategy and publishes additional
state information in order to make Bob generate unambiguous keys, as in B9257. It also requires four qubits for an
unambiguous key. In addition, it takes 1 transmission to complete the all-or-nothing QOT. However, it does not include a
loyalty testing method for the all-or-nothing QOT element. Errors may be detect at application level. The overall cost of
the protocol is 4×R+50.
YYLSZ protocol51: This protocol also requires at least four qubits to obtain an unambiguous key using its all-or-nothing
QOT strategy, i.e. p= 14 . In the all-or-nothing QOT protocol, Alice first sends a sequence to Bob, and Bob then sends
it back after hsi measurement, which takes two transmissions. After this, Alice can test Bob’s loyalty by observing
the probability of occurrence of states |+〉 and |−〉. Note that the strategy must be based on a large number of qubit
consumptions. On the other hand, Bob cannot really test Alice’s loyalty, and is only able to detect errors in the later
application by one-out-of-two OT. The overall cost of the protocol is 4×R+2×50.
Proposed protocol: The proposed protocol requires one qubit for one bit receiving. Alice requires K = 20 qubits (each qubit
for testing has a 12 probability of detecting dishonest Bob) to test Bob’s loyalty with a 0.
99.9999% accuracy. As a result, Bob should prepare a total of 2K = 40 qubits (half K is the alternatives of intentions) to
ensure the vacancy of intentions. In addition, the proposed protocol is able to ensure the loyalty of both agents because
Alice can test it by the nonorthogonal state properties, and Bob can detect the error at application level. The overall cost
of the proposed protocol is R+2×50+2×20.
From Table 1, the proposed protocol becomes most efficient when R > 30, as shown in Figure 1. This demonstrates that
building one-out-of-two QOT directly is more efficient than Cre´peau’s reduction16.
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1-2 QOT Protocols
1Quantum Resource
for a Message
2Transmission
Times
3Decoy
Qubits
4Loyalty
Testing Qubits
5Loyalty
Testing
6Total Cost
Yang’s protocol48 4 1 50 0 None 4×R+50
YSW protocol50 4 1 2×50 0 None 4×R+50
YYLSZ protocol51 4 2 2×50 0 Alice 4×R+2×50
Our protocol 1 2 2×50 2×20 Alice R+2(50+20)
1Quantum Resource for a message: Number of quantum resources consumed for receiving a bit without decoy qubits.
2Transmission Times: Number of transmissions for a sequence.
3Decoy Qubits: Number of decoy qubits, considering the transmission times.
4Loyalty Testing Qubits: Number of loyalty testing qubits.
5Loyalty Testing: Which parties are able to test the loyalty of the other.
6Total Cost: The total quantum consumption under R bits received requirement.
Table 1. Comparison of the performance of three modern one-out-of-two QOT with that of the proposed protocol.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the comparison results
Discussion
This research successfully proposed a simple and efficient one-out-of-two QOT with single nonorthogonal qubits based on
the most basic properties of quantum machines, namely the immunity process, the global phase and nonorthogonal states.
Many important quantum machine applications7, 9, 57 are based on these properties. If one of these properties fails, many
applications will become invalid, the basis of quantum machines will be unstable. In addition, reordering is applied to probide
security against internal attacks by dishonest Alice, while dishonest Bob can always be detected at the application level because
dishonest Alice may cause the errors. As a result, the proposed protocol is not onlyh easily implemented, but is also more
efficient than the compared protocols48, 49, 51–53 based on classical Cre´peau’s reduction16.
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